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This article seeks to contribute to the analyses of the impact of the Covid-19 on the global political economy. 
It does so through a qualitative content analysis of the key policy documents published by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) since the outbreak of the pandemic crisis. The IMF has been, historically, one of the 
main designers of international macroeconomic governance. The paper focuses on fiscal policy, which retains 
a central place in the strategy of the IMF to deal with the pandemic and especially for the post-pandemic 
recovery phase. The analysis of the documents of the IMF contributes (i) to appreciate the interpretation of 
the nature of the pandemic crisis through the lenses of a prominent international financial institution, (ii) to 
explore the policy strategy outlined to deal with the pandemic emergency, (iii) to assess possible changes at 
the level of policy, and accordingly, future directions in global political economy. Evidence suggests that fiscal 
stimulus, public investment and planning will likely have a prominent position in the future directions of the 
IMF policy advice. 
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The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the global economy is unparalleled in terms of extension and depth 
of the recession, with widespread disruptions of global supply chains and fall of aggregate demand. 
Lockdowns, imposed by governments to stop the spread of the virus and avert the overload of national health 
systems, had negative effects on supply, demand, and business confidence, spanning both the financial and 
“productive” dimensions of the economy. Thus, at stake is what many consider a “whole-of-the-economy” 
crisis that will likely leave national economies – across advanced, developing and low-income countries – in 
a very different position than it found them, imposing new issues and, consequently, the need for new solutions. 
In addition, the coronavirus-related crisis has hit the global economy after a decade of sluggish growth and 
secular stagnation – this being another factor which led governments and, above all, international financial 
institutions (IFIs) to put in question at least some of the main assumptions that have guided lending policy 
doctrine before the Covid-19 pandemic.  
The aim of this article is to understand whether, after the outbreak of Covid-19, potential new future 
directions and discontinuities in the global political economy are emerging. To do so, we analyse the policy 
strategy developed by one of the main IFIs, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to tackle the pandemic 
crisis and the “post-pandemic” economic recovery. Since Bretton Woods agreements (1944) to present times, 
the IMF has been one of the main institutional designers of the international financial architecture and global 
economic governance (Rogers 2012). Through an in-depth exploration of the policy documents produced by 
the IMF during the pandemic, the paper aspires to make several accomplishments. First, to understand the 
nature of Covid-19 crisis through the lenses of a key international institution – the IMF. The interpretation of 
a crisis – with both its past developments and future projections – is indeed a “crucial exercise that helps 
explain the policies adopted in response” (Moschella 2010, 136). Second, to explore the policy strategy 
outlined by the IMF to deal with the first phase of the emergency (see also Stubbs, Kring, Laskaridis, 
Kentikelenis and Gallagher (2020) for an early overview of the financial arrangements made by the IMF with 
developing countries). Third and more importantly, to assess possible changes in the policy advice and strategy 
devised by the Fund especially for the recovery phase. With regard to the latter, our main indicator is fiscal 
policy. Fiscal policy can tell us whether a possible policy change is in a phase of further consolidation towards 
some broader reform of austerity doctrine (against a decade-long backdrop of sluggish growth and rising 
inequalities) in relation to issues including public investments, the role of the state, and economic planning. In 
this respect, it is worth stressing that already after the great crisis of 2008 the Fund relaxed its tight fiscal 
consolidation discipline, with a more open stance towards discretionary fiscal policy and ‘smart’ fiscal 
consolidation (Clift 2018; 2019).  
In the paper, we add on existing literature by bringing fresh evidence to explore if some of the changes in 
fiscal policy emerged after the great financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 are further consolidating and expanding, 
in what directions, and with what (potential) long-term consequences. On more conceptual/theoretical grounds, 
the paper conceives the policy strategy devised by the IMF in the context of Covid-19 emergency as part of a 
broader process of consolidation of an increasingly hybrid policy paradigm, which combines elements of 
Keynesianism – especially in terms of a more active fiscal role of the state (Clift and Tomlinson 2007; Strange 
2014) – within a overarching neoliberal commitment to long-term preservation of an open global market 
economy.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section offers an overview of international financial institutions 








discuss the response of the IMF to the global crisis of 2008, with a special emphasis on fiscal policy. This 
focus is functional to advance towards the central and main section, in which we analyse in greater detail the 
IMF policy strategy to tackle the Covid-19 pandemic and its aftermath. Before the concluding remarks, we 




2. International financial institutions1 and the global political economy 
 
The making of the global political economy would not be understandable without taking in full account the 
key contribution of international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, 
and the International Monetary Fund (the “unholy trinity”, following the definition of Richard Peet, 2009). 
Since their creation with the Bretton Woods agreements (1944), IFIs have been critical players in structuring 
and maintaining the global financial architecture and economic governance through lending policy and 
practices, and via a highly technocratic view – an unparalleled “global” epistemic authority (Woods 2006) – 
of economic development and change. Through lending conditionality on the one hand, and the technical 
advice on the other, IFIs exert influence over the policy choices at national level (Broome 2015). Accordingly, 
given their quasi-monopoly of international economic expertise and technocratic authority, and, consequently, 
the power to impose an “official” economic doctrine, IFIs played a key role in shaping both the “development 
project” (late 1940s to early 1970s) and the “globalization project” (1980s to 2000s) (McMichael 2016). 
Importantly, IFI’s action in structuring the global political economy has been influenced by the hegemonic 
role of the US, to the extent that “since their original creation both the IMF and the World Bank have become 
more beholden to their most powerful member states and more susceptible to direct U.S. influence” (Woods 
2006, 27).  
Particularly since the 1980s, the US influence was so remarkable that the policy menu developed by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund was indeed labelled “Washington consensus” (Williamson 
1990; also Babb 2013). Under the influence of neoclassical theory, which assumes that (i) market is efficient 
and the state is not, (ii) capital mobility and the advance of globalization is good, and (iii) monetary policy has 
the priority over fiscal policy (Saad-Filho 2010, 4), the Washington Consensus framework advocated for a 
range of policies such as, among others, “fiscal restraint, reduction of subsidies, broadening the tax base, 
interest rate liberalization, exchange rate liberalization, liberalization of international trade restrictions, 
privatization, and civil service retrenchment” (Broome 2015, 8-9; see also Cowling and Tomlinson 2011). 
Thanks to the consolidation of neoliberal ideology and the establishment of neoliberal governments in 
countries such as the U.S. and UK in the early 1980s, this policy mix was deemed to be universally applicable 
(Williamson 1990), and in fact it drove the structural adjustment programmes across developing countries 
(Peet 2009) and other countries marked by debt crisis (such as Argentina and Chile).  
The adjustment strategy soon proved to be unsuccessful in restoring growth and allowing for debt repayment 
(Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 2003). The countries involved into the Washington Consensus “therapy” shrank 
into stark recession while their debt position worsened (Sheppard and Leitner 2009). The discontent for the 
Washington Consensus policy mix increased during the 1990s, with growing protests and resistances within 
the state and civil society (Saad-Filho 2010).  The array of failures and widespread contestations at the local 
 
1 Despite this work focuses on the case of the International Monetary Fund, in this section we analyse jointly the World 
Bank and the IMF. Particularly since the 1980s onwards, these two international institutions operated in close 
connection and often with overlapping functions and roles. For a detailed reconstruction of the history of the World 
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level, along with the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, pushed IFIs to (partially) revise the policy 
approach developed since the 1980s, mostly based on tight economic (“structural”) reforms and addressed only 
to market forces. Especially from mid-1990s, the IMF and the World Bank started to develop a more 
comprehensive approach to reforms – the so-called “second generation” reforms – by shifting the focus 
towards good governance and state institutions (Wade 2002). In a series of key publications (World Bank 
1996; 1997; 2002; IMF 1997), international institutions addressed domestic policymakers to implement 
institutional reforms and improve the overall quality of governance, advocating «a more comprehensive 
agenda that emphasised good governance, regulatory reforms, and social sustainability» (Güven 2018, 2). 
Stable and strong institutions came to be regarded as the necessary counterpart of sound financial and monetary 
policy, a necessary framework for the development of market economy and market-led growth (Sheppard and 
Leitern 2009, 187-89; Saad-Filho 2010). To be sure, this new agenda – identified as the post-Washington 
consensus (see Stiglitz 2002, the main advocate of the change) – did neither foster a state-led development, 
nor called for a reduction in the scope and pre-eminence of market economy. Rather, it tried to improve the 
quality of state institutions for the market, overcoming the naive “state vs. market” dichotomy and regarding 
both of this two domains as strictly interconnected. According to a key document of the World Bank entirely 
dedicated to the state, we read that «the state is essential for putting in place the appropriate institutional 
foundations for market. And government’s credibility [...] can be as important for attracting private 
investments» (1997, 4; see also IMF 1997). In specific relation to the IMF and its sponsored “good governance” 
approach, “better governance would produce financial rewards and was essential for financial stability” 
(Thirkell-White 2005, 2).   
Therefore, some noted (Saad-Filho 2010; Fine, Van Waeyenberge and Bayliss 2011) that the post-
Washington Consensus did not entail a paradigm change compared to the Washington Consensus (also Babb 
2013), as the policy advice and practices of IFIs continued to be rooted in mainstream economics and within 
a strong vision of market-led development. On the other hand, and more recently, other authors also stressed 
the (growing) internal debates and positions within the Fund, which rather than being a sort of one-size-fits-
all bastion of neoliberalism is internally characterised by a more heterogeneous repertoire of macroeconomic 
beliefs including Keynesianism, the Neo-Classical Synthesis, the New Classical Economics and the New 
Keynesian Macroeconomics (see Clift 2018), and even by tensions and contradictions (Grabel 2017) – though, 
it is worth stressing, all falling within the mainstream, namely “within the parameters of a socially constructed 
and relatively limited range of acceptable or respectable economic ideas upon which the Fund is inclined to 
draw” (Clift 2019, 8). While the global financial crisis seemed to have opened spaces for “progressive” 
transformations (Strange 2014), the “economic doctrine core” of IMF policy advice did not change on 
structural grounds; yet, in the literatures it is also discussed the increasing narrowing of such policy advice 
over time by – importantly – focusing on fiscal policy rather than on structural reforms as privatization, 
deregulation and liberalization (Broome 2015; Ban 2015; Ban and Gallagher 2015). In this specific respect, 
Clift pointed out that the rethinking of fiscal policy after the crisis applies only to advanced economies with 
fiscal space, and in the context of the post-global financial crisis recessionary conditions – a change “modest 
but significant” (Clift 2019, 1) especially with respect to the debate on austerity doctrine. 
In the next paragraph we analyse in greater detail the IMF response to the global financial crisis of 2008, 
with a particular focus on fiscal policy: a necessary step indeed to understand if, and to what extent, the current 
policy strategy may represent a more substantial departure from the policy menu developed since the outbreak 











3. The IMF vis-à-vis the global financial crisis of 2008 
 
Similarly to what is happening with the current Covid-19 crisis, also the financial crisis of 2008 severely hit 
the global economy and pushed international institutions, the IMF in particular, to put in question the overall 
policy strategy as developed since the 1990s (see the special issue of Governance (2015)). In general terms, 
according to the Fund the causes of the financial crisis of 2008 were especially related to the lack of market 
discipline, in the form of excessive leverage and risk tacking, poor financial regulation, and lack of global 
oversight. In other words, the loosening of controls on capital movements led to an asset price bubble and 
accumulation of external imbalances (IMF 2009, 9-10; see Moschella 2010, ch. 6), namely the sources of the 
subprime crisis, which soon after turned into a global financial crisis (triggered by the failure of the US 
investment bank Lehman Brothers). Importantly, the subprime crisis “called into question the contours of the 
international financial architecture” as it “was not just a financial and economic crisis but a political crisis 
because it called into question the principles of international financial cooperation among states” (Moschella 
2010, 121). Actually, the question of capital controls and the possibility to introduce a tighter regulation on 
capital movements – coupled with a minor emphasis on capital liberalization and marked-led liberalization 
– was one of the main fields in which a policy change would eventually set to emerge (Chwieroth 2014; 
Vetterlain and Moschella 2014).  
Despite the depth and consequences of the great recession, some authors, as already noted, stressed the 
substantial continuity in the trajectory of the Washington Consensus (Güven 2012; Carroll 2012; Babb 2013) 
and its core economic policy. Others shed light on the increasing narrowing of the scope of IMF lending policy 
after the great crisis, whereby “rather than promoting one-size-fits-all structural reforms for borrowers facing 
different economic challenges, the IMF has shifted ‘back to basics’ with a narrower focus on the promotion of 
fiscal consolidation” (Broome 2015, 19). Others, zooming in on a more proactive fiscal policy devised by the 
IMF, conceptualised it as a form of contingent Keynesianism applied only to advanced economies and in the 
wake of the recession, and based on “fiscal policy recommendations [consisting of] targeted social transfers to 
benefit lower earners and poor and vulnerable social groups with a higher propensity to spend” (Clift 2019, 
18). Or, following Strange (2014, 34), as an emerging typology of ordo-Keynesianism, namely a combination 
of “ordoliberal constraints with more sophisticated Keynesian principles designed to manage the market and 
balance up growth over the long term, while also retaining the openness demanded by a globalised political 
economy”. 
As the debate already testify, the question of fiscal consolidation, and fiscal policy more broadly, is 
analytically relevant for several reasons. First of all because “fiscal policy, or the making of decisions about 
how states collect and spend money to influence the economy, is at the heart of democratic politics itself” (Ban 
2015, 167). Second, because fiscal policy is one of the indicators of change adopted by our analysis and helps 
us to understand whether a change in long-standing assumptions about fiscal austerity and retrenchment are 
changing substantially.  
With specific respect to the IMF and fiscal policy after the great crisis of 2008, Cornel Ban noted that  
 
the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession have not led to a “Berlin Wall” moment for the IMF’s doctrine 
on fiscal policy. Instead, the Fund made adaptive changes to its precrisis policy status quo. An older emphasis on 
maintaining states’ credibility with financial markets remained the primary goal of policy, but this goal now had 
to cohabit with greater acceptance of discretionary fiscal stimulus programs and an emphasis on gradual fiscal 
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After the crisis of 2008 the IMF partially and gradually started to consider relaxing tight austerity doctrine, 
yet without dismissing the overall priority of fiscal stability and “smart” long-term fiscal consolidation (more 
below). In fact, immediately after the GFC the Fund developed a strategy based on four pillars:  «(i) reliance 
on temporary or self-reversing measures in fiscal stimulus packages; (ii) medium-term fiscal frameworks 
envisaging a fiscal correction, once economic conditions improve; (iii) growth-enhancing structural reforms; 
and (iv) a firm commitment to contain the fiscal costs stemming from population aging» (2009, 37). Crucially, 
the intervention of the state through fiscal policy action was devised as necessary insofar as it would sustain 
the collapsing private sector, even if this may lead to the deterioration of the deficit-to-GDP ratio and public 
debt. This intervention was conceived to be temporary: as soon as the crisis would be over, the fiscal 
consolidation programme had to be restored. In this respect, the IMF’s strategy advised for a mix of “smart” 
fiscal consolidation, namely favouring a balance between growth and fiscal adjustment, and structural reforms 
– especially labour and pensions – to boost growth, thus returning to more orthodox avenues of neoliberal and 
austerity policy (IMF 2013, 19-20). This is testified, among other historical events, by the unfolding of the 
Greek crisis (2014) and the associated “troika therapy”2 – even if, interestingly, some noted that in this case 
the EU proved to be more orthodox in terms of austerity policy compared to the IMF (see Rogers 2012, ch. 8; 
Hodson 2015).  
The post-2008 phase signalled a limited adaptation of policy orthodoxy by the IMF, within structural 
continuities and with the priority assigned to fiscal stability and smart fiscal consolidation, and structural 
reforms. To Cornel Ban fiscal policy did not entail a wide-ranging paradigm shift since the “Fund did not 
experience the kind of generational change it experienced during the 1980s when postwar neo-Keynesians 
retired and made room for a generation of economists who had been shaped by the New Classical revolution 
of the 1970s” (Ban 2015, 168-169; see also Grabel 2011). On the other hand, others also noted that the specific 
role of the state (especially with respect to fiscal stimulus) came to be regarded as basically subservient to the 
overall preservation of market framework, while the factor of planning did not even emerge as a possible 
option. “In the wake of the crisis” - as Fine, Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge wrote (2011, 270) - “whilst both 
the World Bank and the IMF have emphasised the necessity of providing safety nets to the vulnerable and of 
preserving economic and social infrastructure, the suspicion must be that this is designed to rationalise state 
support to private provision”. In other words, the expansion of state budget and the growing debt of public 
sector aimed to preserve the private sector, rather than designing an alternative route of economic development.  
About a decade ago, in their analysis of global capitalist governance after the Washington Consensus (and 
global crisis), Sheppard and Leitner skilfully noted that “neoliberalism, as we know it, is in question. The 
current crisis has made Hayekian nostrums unpopular, but faith in the market runs deep, and it will probably 
take a decade before it becomes clear what supplement emerges to manage this crisis” (2010, 193). While in 
the ten years following to Sheppard and Leitner’s prediction policy “supplements” hardly can be conceived as 
a wholesale paradigm change (despite the growing distrust towards orthodox neoliberal policy, and in the face 
of growing societal imbalances), the Covid-19 may be one of those historical events that may speed-up 




2 Greece was the first Eurozone country to receive financial support by the IMF in 2010, followed in the three years 









4. The IMF and the policy response to the Covid-19 pandemic  
 
After more than ten years of sluggish growth and rising inequalities, the Covid-19 pandemic spread 
throughout the world and triggered the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. States and 
international institutions – the IMF being at the forefront – reacted quickly by deploying a set of unprecedented 
fiscal and monetary policy measures. The IMF, which immediately recognised the unprecedented nature of the 
crisis, developed an ambitious and comprehensive strategy aimed, in the short run, to tackle the unfolding and 
immediate consequences of the emergency and economic depression, while, in the medium term, to put in 
action a full-blown political economy framework for the recovery phase. As we show in full-length below, 
especially this second-stage policy strategy reveals some important elements concerning a possible alternative 
route from the lending principles of the post-Washington consensus and its policy menu.  
In what follows, we analyse in particular the flagship documents – that is, Fiscal Monitor (2020a, 2020b), 
World Economic Outlook (2020c, 2020d), and Global Financial Stability Report (2020e, 2020f) – issued by 
the IMF in two periods of the year, April and October. These documents are the “most influential policy and 
research milieus” (Ban 2015, 168) of the Fund. They “reflect the IMF’s official views on fiscal policy”, while 
also “they are also ideal sites in which to study the role of economic ideas in policy change” (ibid). In specific 
relation to the documents analysed, they aim to (i) provide up-to-date knowledge and data on global economy; 
(ii) assess the impact of Covid-19 pandemic on the economy and society, and on public finances; (iii) outline, 
especially in the Fiscal Monitor series, a broader policy strategy to tackle with the economic disruption 
deriving from the Covid-19 crisis. As already noted, in the analysis we pay close attention especially to fiscal 
policy, which – importantly – is directly related to other key issues as the role of the government, public 
spending and economic planning.  
In the documents, partly as occurred with the post-2008 response, fiscal policy retains a central place in the 
IMF strategy, which developed a set of guidelines to help policymakers to deal with the uncertainty of the 
coronavirus crisis. Overall, fiscal policy, the IMF asserts, should be “adapted” to the various phases of the 
emergency and post-pandemic recovery. In this respect, the IMF develops a two-stage strategy aimed, in the 
wake of the emergency, to preserve livelihoods and social and economic relations by directing public spending 
to health sector and liquidity support to households and firms. In other words, to do “whatever it takes” (IMF 
2020d, 4) to avert economic collapse. Second, in the post-pandemic phase, the IMF outlines a bold fiscal 
strategy – with national governments at the forefront – to boost the recovery. Especially this second phase, we 
argue, offers some key insights to understand possible future directions of the global political economy.   
 
 
4.1. Tackling the emergency, doing “whatever it takes” 
 
The IMF’s analysis of the impact of Covid-19 begins with the recognition of the unprecedented nature of 
the current crisis, which has its origins neither in the financial sector nor in the productive sphere. The main 
cause of this “unique recession” (IMF 2020d, 2) is directly correlated to lockdowns and other forms of social 
distancing needed to stop the spread of the virus (IMF 2020b, ch. 2; 2020c; 2020d). One outcome of these 
health measures is the interruption of the economic activity and disruption of supply chains, so that “layoffs, 
income declines, fear of contagion, and heightened uncertainty make people spend less, triggering further 
business closures and job losses” (IMF 2020c, 2; see also IMF 2020e; 2020f). The effects of lockdowns are 
also unevenly spread across gender, social and age groups, and affect especially lower-income households, 
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the other hand, the persistence of health risk, the possibility of new localized outbreaks of the virus, and the 
time of vaccine production constitute one of the main factors underpinning the nature of Covid-19 pandemic: 
uncertainty, in its turn making more difficult (for example compared to the global financial crisis of 2008) to 
take effective policy action especially in the medium term. In the case of Covid-19 pandemic, uncertainty is 
“unusually large” (IMF 2020d, XV) for a number of different but intertwined reasons: the difficulty to forecast 
public health and economic factors; the extent of global spillovers (tourism, soft demand, remittances); the 
sweeping sentiment of financial markets; the damage of supply potential (ibid., XV-XIV, 6-9; see also 2020a; 
2020b; 2020c). In the guise of a future scenario analysis, the IMF has developed a set of potential “upside” 
and “downside” risks that can improve or worsen the evolution of the pandemic and of the economy, 
accordingly, of the policy measures to be implemented. Among the “upside risks”, there are the possibility of 
faster “normalization” of the economic context that can mitigate the recession, the possible extension of the 
fiscal stimulus in 2021, a faster growth in productivity, and, on the health side, (1) advances in therapy with 
reduction in the transmission of the virus, (2) and the production of an effective vaccine. As regards the factors 
that can exacerbate the situation, the IMF indicates – among others – local outbreaks of the virus, a tightening 
of the overall financial conditions and withdrawal of (especially fiscal) policy support, shortfall of liquidity, 
social unrest and geopolitical tensions, global trade and technology frictions, and natural disasters (IMF 2020a, 
19-20; IMF 2020b, 11-12).   
The analysis of the nature of Covid-19 crisis through the lenses of the IMF allows us to zoom in on the 
policy guidelines and principles developed by the Fund to deal with this unprecedented situation, and its 
associated risks and uncertainty.  
In specific relation to the first of the two phases outlined above – in the height of the health emergency –, 
the priority outlined by the IMF is to accommodate spending needs for health and emergency services 
“regardless of how much room a country may have in the budget” (IMF 2020a, 13), to the extent that also for 
low-income developing countries “ramping up public health expenditure is the number one priority 
irrespective of the fiscal space and debt positions” (ibid, 18). To the IMF, policymakers need to ensure (i) 
budget execution among various government levels, (ii) expedite procurement of medical needs (new 
hospitals, equipment and supplies), (iii) allocate sufficient funds for subnational governments to spend on 
health services or mobilize medical resources (ibid, 14; 2020c). While suggesting lockdowns and social 
distancing as long as the health crisis persists, the other goal of the IMF policy is to avert the overload of the 
health system, while restoring public trust as well as consumer confidence, thus preparing the post-pandemic 
recovery (IMF 2020c).  
The other set of fiscal measures developed during the heights of the emergency aims to assist households 
and firms, averting a serious collapse of social and economic relations. Therefore by April 2020 the IMF 
already developed a set of detailed policy guidelines to provide for assistance to national policymakers (Tab 
1). 
The measures actually implemented by governments, especially in advanced economies – characterised by 
wider social safety net, ample fiscal space, access to international credit at low interest rates, and central 
banks that provided monetary stimulus and purchased government and corporate bonds “while retaining 
credibility to deliver low inflation” (IMF 2020b, 1) – have consisted of “additional spending or forgone 
revenue, including temporary tax cuts, and the other half liquidity support, including loans, guarantees, and 
equity injections by the public sector” (ibid.). In the Fiscal Monitor issue of October (2020b), the IMF 
evaluates in positive terms the role of governments and fiscal policy in supporting households and families 









the massive fiscal support undertaken since the start of the COVID-19 crisis has saved lives and 
livelihoods. Public health policies that contained the spread of the disease were particularly effective 
because they also supported the recovery by restoring confidence and permitting a safe reopening of 
activity. Cash transfers were vital for the poor, who spent them largely on necessities. Unemployment 
benefits supported consumption for people who lost their main source of income (IMF 2020b, 1).   
 
Table 1 - Policy-making in the wake of Covid-19 emergency  
Identified problems 






● Lockdowns and 
quarantines reduce 
production and capacity 
utilization 
● Disruption to regional and 
global supply chains  
● Layoffs and bankruptcy  
 
Clear objectives and emphasis on 
solidarity. That is, “measures should try 
to strengthen solidarity by not being 




● Allow automatic stabilizers to 
fully operate and channel 
additional support through 
social safety net  
● Enhance unemployment 
benefit to the fullest possible 
extent  
● Introduce (temporary) paid 
sick leave commensurate to 
the health crisis 
● Design phase out 
mechanisms in relation to 
wage subsidies  
● Deliver rapid relief to 
liquidity-constrained 
households, including to the 
self-employed and those in 




● General loss of income  
● Reduction of consumption 
and firms’ investments 
● Particularly vulnerable low-
income households and 
workers in sectors as 
tourism and hospitality 
● Countries or regions that 
rely heavily on oil 
revenues, tourism, and 
exports of goods and 
services are more affected 
 
Fiscal measures should be targeted, 
temporary, and progressive: 
● Targeted to households to 
maintain basic needs 
● Targeted to firms to avert 
layoffs and exist from supply 
chain 
● Progressive, to ensure that 
low-income households benefit 
more 
 
Revenue measures:  
● Reduction in taxes paid 
monthly or quarterly  
● Tax advantages to improve 
the production the 
production of medical 
supplies 
● Avoid profit based incentives 
as blank amnesties, tax 
holidays, tax reduction 
● Grant tax advantages only to 
hard-hit sectors (tourism-
dependent sectors, 
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that experience a decline in 
sales or profits above a 
certain threshold; to critical 
products (medical supplies)  
  
Uncertainty may lead to:  
● a vicious cycle of 
dampening consumer 
confidence and tightening 
financial conditions 
● job losses and cuts in 
investment in expectation 
of lower aggregate 
demand  
 
Tax and Spending should be cost-
effective and embedded in medium-term 
budget framework: (i) avoid long-lasting 
deterioration of public finance; (ii) 





● Measure to support liquidity 
should be properly costed, 
recorded and monitored 
● Liquidity support should be 
conditional on the duration 
of the pandemic in order to 
avoid keeping nonviable 
firms afloat with subsidized 
finance  
● Manage the fiscal risk 
associated to liquidity 
support by assessing and 
quantifying the potential 
sources and size of fiscal 
cost 
 
 Measures should be embedded into 
existing programs and infrastructure. 
Institutional capacity makes a difference 
by influencing the form, instruments and 
channels of support  
 
 
 Take into account financial constraints 
 
 
 Good governance, transparency and 
accountability should guide the policy 
cycle 
 
Source: Authors' elaboration 
 
On the other hand, the IMF stresses also the risks associated to fiscal policy and rising debt levels. In fact, 
the Fund presents a series of possible negative outcomes deriving from massive financial injections through 
an extended period of time. The already mentioned record-high rise of public debt, which can constraint the 
access to international credit lines and the possibility to repay the debt in the medium term. Also, while wage 
subsidies preserved jobs and worker-firm relations, they also could – according to the Fund – slow labour 
market reallocations. Or, tax deferrals bear the risk to become permanent, damaging the revenue level of 
government; even liquidity injection to firms, while necessary to avoid bankruptcy, could delay sectoral 
reallocation that is crucial for the recovery (IMF 2020b, 2–5). Does this constitute a prospective call for – as 








effects of expansionary fiscal policy on public finance, one could hypothesise that, as soon as the emergency 
period is over, the IMF would resort to the usual policy menu based on fiscal retrenchment. Yet, as next 
paragraph shows, the picture is more nuanced.     
 
 
4.2. Post-pandemic economy, the role of government and economic planning 
 
In the previous section we emphasised the central role of fiscal policy throughout the various stages of the 
emergency. In this paragraph we analyse the IMF’s prescriptions about the role of fiscal policy in the post-
pandemic economic recovery. In other words, what the IMF “thinks” of the post-Covid-19 era and its economic 
underpinnings. Thus, with the analysis of the documents we aim to understand if, and to what extent, the IMF’s 
policy strategy designed for the recovery phase can be considered as a breakup especially with tight austerity 
doctrine and market-led development.  
Once again, Fiscal Monitor is the main document with which the IMF outlines a comprehensive policy 
strategy, a key dimension of which is dedicated to the strategy that will accompany the global economy once 
Covid-19 is under control. Both the issues of April and especially October outlined a different strategy to boost 
recovery, with the triad government–fiscal stimulus–planning at the forefront. Such strategy is not only aimed 
at restoring economic growth after the coronavirus-related depression, but also at overcoming a decade of 
sluggish growth and “secular stagnation” (IMF 2020b). In fact, while “[l]ow growth and investment, adverse 
shocks, and low inflation and interest rates during the past few years put fiscal policy at the forefront”, in 
addition “COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 has strengthened the case for fiscal policy action and heightened its 
urgency” (IMF 2020a, 27).  
In April, the IMF made the case for public investment through the strategy “IDEAS” (Investments, 
Discretionary measures, Enhancing Automatic Stabilizers) (IMF 2020a, ch. 2; Tab 2). The rationale of this 
strategy goes that public investment “could act as a bridge to sustainable, resilient, and inclusive economic 
growth, including by lifting productivity, creating jobs, and spurring private sector investment” (IMF 2020a, 
28). The objective of IDEAS strategy is to provide a ready/effective countercyclical fiscal stimulus in case of 
downturn, supporting aggregate demand and production. In this case too, the IMF has outlined a 
comprehensive approach comprising several investment areas, detailed policy design, guiding principles, and 
a key role for institutions and governance (Tab 2). 
While IDEAS strategy aimed to make a case of fiscal stimulus especially in times of economic downturn, the 
Fiscal Monitor issue of October outlines a broader strategy to boost growth and create jobs, with a particular 
attention for public investments and economic planning. The IMF put forth several arguments to sustain the 
necessity to scale up public investments. First of all, as already noted the Fund takes in full account the secular 
stagnation tendency – and the interlinked slowdown of capital accumulation –, likely worsened (in the short 
and medium term) by the Covid-19 crisis. Second, again in regard of the overall context, the IMF emphasises 
that the historic lows of interest rates and inflation constitute a possibility to “easily finance an investment 
scale up” (IMF 2020b, 31). Thus, “borrowing to finance high-quality investment will be desirable, since cheap 
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Table 2 - IDEAS strategy  
Investments 
 
Discretionary measures Enhancing Automatic Stabilizers 
Sustainable investments areas 
● Sectors with positive 
externalities (health and 




● Climate change  
● Sustainable development 
goals (water services, 
electricity, sanitation)  
● Investment management (to 
improve efficiency) 
 
Identify high quality measures to be 
deployed, as a rule-based fiscal 
stimulus, in case of downside risks 
and recession.  
Automatic stabilizers are mechanisms 
built into government budgets that 
raise (reduce) spending or reduce 
(increase) taxes when the economy 
slows (expands).  
Objective: reducing economic 




Investment efficiency  
● Sound institutional processes 
● Establish a central register of 
infrastructure projects, 
tighten financial rules on 
public-private partnerships, 
and disclose more ex post 
reviews and audits of capital 
projects  
● Strengthen the links among 
the national planning 
framework, long-term capital 




Positive outcomes and design of 
discretionary measures include: 
● Countercyclical function 
● Appropriate in response to 
deep and prolonged 
downturns when support 
from automatic stabilizers 
and social safety nets is not 
sufficient  
● Design discretionary 
measures to be 
automatically activated in 
case of recession (e.g. in 
correspondence to a large 
increase of unemployment) 
● Examples of discretionary 
measures include, on the 
demand-side: tax cuts to 
low-income families, tax 
policies affecting the firm; 
on the supply-side: 
temporary extension of the 
coverage and duration of 
unemployment benefit, or 
well-targeted transfers to 
Channels for enhancing automatic 
stabilizers: 
● Disposable income 
● Social Insurance and 
redistribution (insure income 
for unemployed and protect 
poor households)  
 
Mechanism for enhancing automatic 
stabilizers: 
● reinforcing spending-side 
automatic stabilizers  
● protecting households by 
providing adequate income 
support in difficult times.  
 
Programs for enhancing automatic 
stabilizers: 
● cash transfers, food stamps, 
child allowances, and social 
pensions;  
● in-kind transfers  
● income-support schemes for 
low-income households, 









low-income or liquidity 
constrained households  
● To improve the efficacy and 
timing of the stimulus 
identify pipeline projects 
(especially upgrades, 
maintenance, and repair)  
 
● public works  
● fee waivers, including for 
health care 
Sustainable financing through budget-
neutral investments  
 
   
Stronger governance and institutions: 
● Better capture of the 
returns to investment, and 
management of fiscal risks 
arising from public-private 
partnerships 
● Greater debt transparency  
● Improved coordination with 




Source: Authors' elaboration 
 
 
Another relevant point raised by the IMF concerns the relation between private and public investments, and 
the revision of the crowding out hypothesis. In general terms, “the crowding out argument, a mainstay of the 
analysis of state/market relations, assumes increases in public spending will simply ‘crowd out’ (inherently 
more efficient) private consumption and investment” (Clift 2019, 10). While already after 2008 crisis the Fund 
(partly) reconsidered government borrowing and spending, in the case of the Covid-19 scenario the IMF 
crucially recognises that (1) “uncertainty about the course of the pandemic has further dampened private 
investment and spurred higher levels of precautionary saving”; and more importantly, that (2) “public 
investment has slowed since the 1990s, reducing the capital-stock-to-GDP and public-to-private-capital ratios 
in all income groups [...] especially in the health, housing, and environmental protection sectors, weakening 
societies’ resilience to COVID-19” (ibid., 32). Thus, alongside the acknowledgment of the decline of public-
to-private capital ratio, and accordingly of societies’ resilience to crises, the Fund argues also that public 
investments can have a crowd in effect on private investment, therefore acting as a “catalyst” and overcoming 
a dichotomous and conflictual view of public and private capital.  
Other important elements of the strategy developed by the IMF for the post-pandemic era concern the role 
of the government and, linked to this, macroeconomic planning. In relation to the first, while generally the 
post-Washington consensus broadly takes into account the importance of government and institutions for the 
market, in the case of the “pandemic documents” it seems that the government, instead of merely creating a 
stable and good governance framework for the market, is rather at the forefront in leading societies through 
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Governments now also need to prepare economies for safe and successful reopening, foster recovery in 
employment and economic activity, and facilitate transformation to a post-pandemic economy that, with the right 
policies, can be more resilient, more inclusive, and greener. Public investment can make a crucial contribution 
toward these goals (IMF 2020b, 31).  
   
The question of planning also deserves particular attention. In general terms, over the last decades the 
political (and economic) ideology in the West “has moved away from economic planning approaches towards 
a reduction of state intervention” (Genovese, Morris and Acquaye 2020), with ongoing cycles of privatization 
and market liberalization. In the case of post-pandemic recovery, the IMF urges governments to start planning 
for development priorities; that is, “for projects that will accompany the likely economic and social 
transformations as economies recover from the crisis” (IMF 2020b, 36). Recovery, as the IMF makes clear, is 
not to be left to market forces (or, mostly on market forces with the state in a subservient position) but centred 
upon government macroeconomic intervention through fiscal policy and planning. Also jobs creation is seen 
as a positive effect of the joint action of fiscal stimulus/public investment and planning. Once again, the starting 
point is the real sharpest rise in unemployment levels since the Great Depression due to Covid-19 pandemic, 
adding on the factor of the persistent high unemployment in many advanced economies.  
 




● Focus on maintenance of existing infrastructure  
● Review and reprioritize active projects  
● Create and maintain a pipeline of projects that 
can be delivered within a couple of years 
● Start planning for the new development priorities 
stemming from the crisis 
 
● Crowd in effect on private investment  
● Mitigate secular stagnation 
● Job creation 
● Fiscal multipliers  
Source: Authors' elaboration 
 
Importantly, the IMF asserts that, on the one hand, “job creation will be an essential criterion in deciding on 
the size and composition of a fiscal stimulus” (ibid., 37), on the other, “public investment [...] would create 
millions of jobs directly in the short term and could also create many additional jobs indirectly and in the 
longer term” (ibid., 45). Before discussing the results, Table 3 shows some of the main positive outcomes 
outlined by the IMF and directly related to public investments and planning. Thus, the IMF conceives the state, 
fiscal policy and public investments as the pivot of the recovery phase, and the leverage to rescue Western 
capitalism from the secular stagnation tendency.  
 
 
5. Discussion  
 
Through the analysis of the flagship documents produced by the IMF during the pandemic period, our study 
aimed to understand if, under the impact of Covid-19 crisis and after a decade of sluggish growth, at stake is 
an early process of more substantive redefinition of the policy framework and advice, in particular as regards 








the GFC has been subject of widespread scrutiny and controversies (Ban and Gallagher 2015). Several studies 
argued that – especially in the domain of fiscal policy – a shift from orthodox avenues towards hybrid forms 
of neo-Keynesianism actually occurred (Grabel 2014; Strange 2014; Clift 2018), while others stressed that 
“fiscal policy during the Great Recession [...] falls short of a paradigmatic shift” (Ban 2015, 169-70; Broome 
2015) despite some (especially short-term) changes emerged. In addition, it seems also that the “creative” use 
of policy instruments from competing frameworks displayed the paradoxical effect of making “neoliberalism 
more resilient to challenges than classical liberalism ever was” (Ban 2020, 83).  
Taking stock of the debate, our paper brings evidences to what can be conceptualised as a process of 
increasing and consolidating paradigm hybridization, in which – pragmatically – a more pro-active state 
intervention is devised as necessary to restore capital accumulation and preserve market economy on the long 
run, also vis-à-vis the serious issue of socio-political unrest linked to the social repercussions of the pandemic 
(IMF 2021). Importantly, a key element that we stressed in the analysis, and partly constituting a potential 
novelty, is the long-term view of recovery by expansionary fiscal policy associated to a more proactive role of 
state intervention.  
Prior to discuss the main empirical elements of our analysis, it is worth noting first several key societal 
dynamics that need to be taken seriously to understand contemporary sources of pressures that militate for a 
change in policymaking. Pressures, it is worth noting, that are explicitly taken into account by the IMF. First 
of all, neoliberal policy prescriptions – coupled with austerity measures, especially in the Eurozone –, and 
more generally market-led development, did not manage to restore a sustained, balanced and shared economic 
growth after the global crisis of 2008. Inequalities and poverty have also risen sharply, along with wage 
stagnation and unemployment. The IMF fully and repeatedly acknowledges the stagnation tendency and 
associated decline in capital accumulation well before the eruption of Covid-19 crisis. This factor accounts in 
the IMF’s interpretation of the current crisis, and accordingly, of the policy advice to accompany the recovery 
phase. The second key factor to take into account is social unrest, being therefore a problem of legitimation. 
In other words, the IMF fully recognises (2020a) that social unrest and widespread tensions have characterised 
social and political relations in the West over the last decade, with a growing concern about the legitimation 
of orthodox policy choices and the concrete effects of these latter (actually, a socio- process testified by the 
political consolidation of more radical and (once) politically peripheral political forces). Third and importantly, 
the Covid-19 is an exogenous shock of unprecedented nature and extent. This crisis touches all sectors of the 
economy and poses new threats for public health and the future recovery phase. For this reason, it is also worth 
stressing that the IMF emphasises the factor of uncertainty, which in the case of the pandemic is “unusually 
large”. Thus, the nature of the crisis and the related uncertainty constitute an extremely powerful source of 
pressure for (policy) change, especially with reference to the development (failures) of the post-2008 phase. 
Another element of interest is the recognition, by the IMF, of the decline of public-to-private capital ratios 
since the 1990s, and how this brings down the resilience of society while also improving inequalities – in stark 
contrast with more orthodox perspectives centred on favouring private investments through privatization, 
market liberalization and fiscal consolidation.  
Now it is possible to discuss in greater detail the documents analysed. The first element standing out is the 
role of expansionary fiscal policy and its seemingly structural dimension. In other words, its future projection 
and long-term impact. Such policy advice – unlike the 2008 crisis, where the stimulus was mostly 
circumscribed to the post-crisis phase and to advanced economies – seems to be not a case of temporary 
stimulus aimed to sustain aggregate demand and preserve socio-economies relations as long as the crisis 
unfolds, retuning to tight fiscal discipline when the height of the (financial) crisis is over. In this case, the 
analysis seems to show a broader and bolder vision of fiscal stimulus, and of public investments within it, with 
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innovation. “Beyond its macroeconomic implications” – the IMF writes – “public investment is essential to 
raise long-term economic growth [...] and to strengthen economies’ resilience to crises. In the long term, public 
investment in infrastructure can help reduce inequality by fostering structural transformation” (IMF 2020b, 
32; IMF 2021). Linked to this, there is also the purpose of job creation through fiscal stimulus. The objective 
of boosting growth and employment is not left to market forces and private capital alone, but is strongly based 
on a public investment-led development strategy, able also to crowd in private capital and boost capital 
accumulation. A further element of particular interest is planning. Planning is related to the critical role of 
national governments in setting a hierarchy of objectives, and to the already mentioned purpose of job creation, 
a task where market-led development failed.  
Importantly, if a future direction in global economic governance should be imagined based on the IMF 
lenses, it seems that this will be characterised by a more active role of the state and of fiscal policy in particular 
through public spending and planning. The state, in other words, seemingly will be neither just called upon to 
rescued the private sector and preserve social relations in times or recession, nor be reformed to provide for 
the best possible regulatory framework for markets. By contrast, given the economic situation inherited from 
the past and the impact of the pandemic, coupled with longstanding failures of marked-led development, the 






The Covid-19 is a crisis of unprecedented nature that touches upon all sectors of the economy and seriously 
affects social cohesion and the preservation of livelihoods. The pandemic also bears unusually large levels of 
uncertainty, in particular due to the duration of the health crisis and the necessity of localized lockdowns to 
stop the spread of the virus. Furthermore, the Covid-19 crisis emerged after ten years of sluggish growth and 
rising inequalities, actually amplifying such imbalances.  
Our research shed light on the IMF’s understanding of the crisis, past developments, and policy advice to 
deal with the pandemic. We focused on fiscal policy in particular, one of the main domains in which the Fund 
advises national governments and exercises its authority. After the crisis of 2008, a moderate change in fiscal 
policy has been reported, with an emphasis on discretionary fiscal stimulus and gradual fiscal consolidation 
after the crisis. As Ban notes, “the IMF reformers worked to cobble together a more reformist, flexible and 
pragmatic neoliberal policy paradigm for the age of financialization, secular stagnation and political turbulence 
in societies riveted by growing inequality” (2020, 83; emphasis added).  
The credibility towards creditors and fiscal consolidation remained a key priority which has not been 
structurally questioned, even in relation to the Covid-19 crisis and its aftermath and despite the fact that the 
emphasis on fiscal consolidation is significantly less present than in the pre-Covid-19 documents. On the other 
hand, we argue also that the stress on fiscal stimulus, public investments and planning, and the purpose of job 
creation, are key domains in which a more substantive change in the Fund’s policy advice could consolidate 
in the future.   
Our analysis, despite being insightful (and full of future implications) as regards some relevant changes in 
IMF’s fiscal policy advice, is nonetheless circumscribed to the documents produced during the pandemic 
phase. Furthermore, while generally in capitalist crises the burden of adjustment shifts from capital to labour, 
it is still premature to forecast a clear pattern in international and national policymaking. Not only because the 
intertwining of the health and economic crises is still in place, with lockdowns and local outbreaks occurring, 








impact existing societal inequalities and macroeconomic imbalances. In this uncertain scenario, other research 
questions arise: to what extent the changes looming at the horizon will consolidate and produce durable effects 
in the medium and long-run, with a new role for the state and state-led development? How will the Fund’s 
strategy impact upon national governments?  How will the Fund’s policies both influence, and adjust to, the 
changing conditions of global capitalism? Also, future researches need to take in due account if this phase will 
bear systemic consequences in terms of a full-blown paradigm change as occurred with the transition from 
Keynesianism to neoliberalism, rather than a complex – while contradictory – adaptation. In this regard, further 
elements must be taken into account: from the rise of new dominant ideas and ideology to the redefinition of 
transnational social relations of production, from further political transformations of national states to a new 
proactive role of international financial institutions in fostering processes of change, to broader changes in the 
international order with the consolidation of power of new actors – China, prominently. Actually, while the 
post-2008 marked a partial continuity within neoliberal policy, the current Covid-19, coupled with 
longstanding imbalances accumulated especially after the Great Crisis of 2008, is such an historical occurrence 
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